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The term “ engaged Buddhism,” i.e., socially engaged Buddhism, 
was first used by the Vietnamese Zen monk Thich Nhat Hahn in 1963 
in his book by that name. It was written during the Vietnamese War 
and expressed the spirit of his attempt to form a non-aligned, non-bel­
ligerent Buddhist coalition that he described as “ an enemy-of-neither 
combatant.”  Later he would say that indeed Buddhism has always 
been (socially) engaged. Yet his term has been picked up by both Bud­
dhists and non-Buddhists in Europe and the United States as a designa­
tion of something new that is occurring in Buddhism. And books, arti­
cles and presentations on the subject have multiplied.
We must ask: Why should this be the case? Why should Buddhists 
be, have been, considered socially inactive, either by themselves or by 
others? And what is new about today’s “ engaged”  Buddhism that has 
not been characteristic of Buddhism in the past?
BUDDHISM AND SOCIETY IN THE PAST
Of course when we speak of Buddhism of the past, we are on the 
whole speaking of Asian Buddhism; and when we speak of the Bud­
dhism of the present, we are including Western (European and Ameri­
can) expressions of it, a factor of prime importance for this discussion, 
whose significance will appear later. First then we must ask: What were 
the social attitudes and complexion of Asian Buddhist teaching present­
ed in its scriptures? Were there no notes of social activism sounded?
The Pali Canon gives us a mixed picture. Certainly there are many 
passages that present the meaning of the Buddhist way of life as one of 
fleeing from  the world (society) and its concerns and activities, and
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almost nothing about its change or renewal. These were left to the im­
personal forces of cyclically conceived history. And society was but the 
expanded form of the basic human bondage to greed, hatred, and delu­
sion, its structures reinforcing that bondage. The truly “ Buddhist” 
way to deal with the world was to form a society of monks and nuns, a 
society within but apart from the larger framework, in which the pure 
life could be led without compromise, and final nirvanic freedom be 
found. The life here would be one of secluded meditation and minimal 
food and clothing.
In the course of time this situation was somewhat modified by practi­
cal necessities. It became obvious that even nirvana seekers needed 
food, clothing, and shelter, best provided by a body of supportive lay 
(still-in-the-world) people. These too must be given some part in the 
good life and some salvational (nirvanic) prospects, even though they 
remained in the secular world.
The monk/nun body (sangha) did have an important social sig­
nificance, to be noted later. Here we may observe that the Pali Canon 
records many encounters of the Buddha with persons of all classes and 
varieties of belief, some of which had societal significance; in his dis­
courses to them some statements about social vices and virtues do ap­
pear. The SigalovOda Sutra sets forth a pattern of social relations and 
obligations to be observed by lay people, though it is quite confor- 
mitarian to Indian social patterns. As I have summarized it elsewhere 
(in In the Hope o f Nibbana, Open Court, LaSalle, 1964):
[T]he Sutta divides human relationships into six basic types 
and prescribes their respective duties. In respect to the first 
three—child-parent, pupil-teacher, wife-husband—it is coun­
seled that child, pupil, and wife should give respect, loyalty, 
and faithful service. . . . The latter [parent, teacher, hus­
band] in turn should provide guidance, loving concern, and 
material necessities. The fourth relation, clansman to clans­
man . . . .  calls for man to man equity of treatment. In the 
fifth the servant gives zealous and contented service to his 
master; and the master [including kings] with paternal solici­
tude . . . .  suits the servant’s work to his capacity and cares 
for him in sickness and trouble, (p. 203)
In summary:
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So far as the social situation itself is concerned, there is no 
prescription for a good society, nor the ideal structuring of hu­
man relationships. There is here no possible doctrine of social 
revolution or change of any sort. All that is called for is that 
each man do his duty in the place or relation where his [kar­
mic] destiny has placed him. (p. 204)
Yet if not revolutionary, it did provide some Buddhist guidance for 
good societal conduct.
Of course such developments did not end here. During the more than 
two millennia of the spread of Buddhism to Southeast Asia, Tibet, Chi­
na, Korea, and Japan, there was a vast body of new (Mahayana) litera­
ture produced, containing societal ideals. Here we shall briefly note 
three outstanding examples of what may be called social idealism.
Key to much of this aspect of the Mahayana literature and tradi­
tion was the magnification of the concept of the bodhisattva, and the 
resulting importance given to the role and significance of the layman. 
To put it briefly: The bodhisattva, a Buddha in the making, became 
everyman's ideal and possibility. No longer was it the secluded, monk­
ish arahat alone aiming for nirvanic salvation out of life’s hurly-burly; 
it was both Buddhist monk and laity who through endless deeds of 
bodhisattvic compassion strove for Buddhahood by helping others 
attain it, that set the pattern of the good life. An eloquent statement of 
the Mahdy&nic ideal of bodhisattvahood is to be found in Santideva’s 
The Path o f Light:
I would fain become a soother of all sorrows of all creatures. 
May I be a balm for the sick, a healer and servitor. . . . My 
own being and my pleasures, all my righteousness in the 
past, present and future, I surrender indifferently that all 
creatures may win to their end [Nirvana or Buddhahood]. . . . 
I would be a protector of the unprotected, a guide to 
wayfarers, a ship, a dyke. . . .  a lamp for them that need a 
lamp. . . .  a slave for them who need a slave. . . .  (J. B. 
Pratt, The Pilgrimage o f Buddhism, Macmillan, New York, 
1928, p. 219)
Another example of the projection of the ideal of social activism is 
found in The Holy Teaching o f Vimalaklrti, a Mahayana scripture
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that came into use sometime early in the Common Era. It might be 
termed the apotheosis of the ideal of Mahayana Buddhist sainthood. 
Vimalaklrti (supposedly described by Gotama Buddha himself) was a 
super-saint, surpassing even the traditionally revered major disciples of 
the Buddha in virtue and wisdom. He was fully enlightened, yet para­
doxically he was a layman who was maximally active in society, i.e., a 
socially engaged Buddhist. He is described thus:
At that time there lived in the city of Vaisali a certain Lic- 
chavi, Vimalaklrti by name. . . .  He wore the white clothes 
of a layman, yet lived impeccably like a religious devotee. He 
lived at home, but remained aloof from the realm of desire. . . . 
He had a son, a wife, and female attendants, yet always 
maintained continence. . . .  He seemed to eat and drink, yet 
always took nourishment from meditation. He made his ap­
pearance in the fields of sports and the casinos, yet his aim 
was always to mature those people who were attached to 
games and gambling. (Tr. Robert Thurman, Pennsylvania 
State Press, University Park, 1976, p. 20)
And so on and on. He was in business, in government offices, visited 
schools, was equally at home with warriors, aristocrats, and common 
people—but all without spiritual or moral compromise. How could 
any one ask for a greater or more complete ideal of social concern and 
involvement than this?
One other instance of the societal application of Buddhist values is 
to be found in one of the works of Nagarjuna (circa 150-250 CE), the 
propounder of the doctrine of emptiness (Mnyatti) and considered to 
be one of the major Mahayana philosophers. In a surprisingly con­
crete, down-to-earth manner he advised King Udayi about the conduct 
of his domain. The substance of the advice was presented in these 
pages (Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1983) by Robert Thurman.
According to Thurman there were four strands to Nagarjuna’s recom­
mendations: (1) individualistic transcendentalism (attainment of Nir­
vana); (2) “ self-restraint, unpacked as detachment and pacifism;”  (3) 
“ [transformative universalism . . . .  [that is] complete commitment 
to a pluralistic, enlightenment-oriented education;”  (4) “ compas­
sionate socialism.” Among the specific items recommended by Nagar- 
juna were those of a welfare-state of “ compassionate socialism,”
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including: fixed charges for doctors and barbers; “ a socially-supported 
health-care delivery system.” In an A^okan manner he suggests 
‘‘hostels, parks, canals, irrigation ponds, rest houses, wells, beds, 
food, grass and firewood.” Further measures were: park-fountains 
where there would also be “ shoes, umbrellas, water filters, tweezers for 
removing thorns, needles, thread, and fans,”  plus food for ants, 
animals, and birds! Finally there were practical recommendations for a 
regulated economy, including low taxes, a royal granary of seed grains, 
a police force, etc.
It would seem then that the Buddhism of the past did not lack for 
either inspirational idealism or practical counsel for social involve­
ment.
There are also concrete examples of Buddhist influence, involve­
ment, and action in the social area. We may note the influence of the 
order of monks (sangha) in Southeastern Asian Theravdda countries. 
Though monks and nuns lived a physically segregated life and were not 
directly involved in the social-political life of their surrounding com­
munities, their social involvement and influence has always been con­
siderable: village headmen often consulted with the head of the local 
monastery about social problems; nationally, the ranking patriarch 
often had substantial influence at court; and upon occasion, as a re­
buke to some public officials for their actions, the monks might turn 
their begging bowls upside down, thus cutting off the flow of merit to 
the laity, a much dreaded measure capable of changing the current of 
political affairs. There was besides what has been called the “ republi­
can” character of the sangha. Wrote Schway Yoe in 1882 in his The 
Burman and his Notions (Macmillan, New York, 1882), II, 132:
It is this republican tendency of Buddhism that gives it such a 
wonderful hold on the people. Rank does not confer on the 
mendicant greater honour, nor release him from any of his ob­
ligations. The most learned and famous Sadaw must go forth 
every morning to beg his food. His dress is the same as that of 
the most recently admitted koyin.
It must be added, however, that reverence for support of the sangha 
tends to absorb most of the philanthropic energy and resources of Ther- 
avSda communities.
The list of Buddhist “ social action”  honorees cannot of course omit
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Atoka (270-230 BCE) the Mauryan ruler of northeastern and central In­
dia. His story is well-known: revolted by the blood and cruelty of the 
last of his conquests he is said to have converted to Buddhism and there­
after ordered his kingdom as nearly along Buddhist lines as he could— 
a kind of welfare state in which religious tolerance and his subjects’ eco­
nomic and social well-being were main concerns. (Perhaps Nflgarjuna 
took some inspiration from Atoka in his letter of counsel to King 
Udayi!) Numbers of scholars have cast doubt upon the shcerly Bud­
dhist nature of Atoka’s welfare regime, seeing in it rather, a kind of 
generic Indian political tolerance.
Whatever the historical truth of the matter, the Atokan tradition of 
politically-oriented Buddhism has been tremendously influential in the 
Asian Buddhist world. It brought Buddhism out of the monastery into 
society and statecraft, providing it with a high moral-social ideal. It in­
spired much imitation—at least on the surface—in Southeast Asia re­
gimes, for centuries. Even today it is frequently appealed to as an exam­
ple of Buddhist statecraft.
We shall note one further example of concrete Buddhist social ac­
tion, one not very well known. In the 1992 Buddhist-Christian Studies 
(Honolulu) Whalen Lai has written of an epoch of significant Buddhist 
social action in China, a country that never fully accepted Buddhism as 
a major cultural element. In a Chinese-produced sutra entitled Aid to 
the Widowed and the Orphaned, we read:
I have repeatedly taught in the various sutras that in donat­
ing, so that both the monk and the householder may cultivate 
the mind of compassion, give [first] to the poor, the singled, 
the old, even unto the hungry dog. But my disciples, not un­
derstanding my intention, donate only to the “ field of rever­
ence”  [monks, stupas, temples] and not to the “ field of com­
passion”  [all those in need]. Of these two fields, the field of 
compassion is far superior, (p. 12)
And in accordance with this new interpretation, the monks of the 
Three Periods sect were “ dedicated to such care [of the needy] and of 
hospital wards being set up at the various temples.”
But in 845 there began a period of the persecution of Chinese Bud­
dhism by the imperial state and so this budding Buddhist social service 
was soon destroyed; the imperial government, Confucian-oriented,
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saw such Buddhist efforts as an infringement of its prerogatives and 
responsibilities, and moved to take over all such charitable enterprises. 
Buddhist “ social concern” perforce disappeared from the Chinese 
scene. So it was that when Christian missionaries appeared on the scene 
they found Buddhism socially disengaged, confined largely to the 
search for personal enlightenment in the monasteries.
Our question then is: With such a wealth of social idealism as one 
finds in the Mahayana scriptures, plus the ASokan model, as well as 
other “ social action” attempts through the centuries as concrete efforts 
and accomplishments in this area, why has there been the strong impres­
sion that Buddhism is perhaps incapable of significant social interest 
and action? There are several relevant factors here. One is the nature of 
Asian history and political/social/economic life. As Ken Jones puts it 
in his The Social Face o f Buddhism (Wisdom Publications, London, 
1989, p. 208):
Until the nineteenth century the social order in the Orient evi­
dently presented for many people much the same kind of 
inevitability as the natural order. Oppressive rulers and their 
wars and exactions together with periodic flood, pestilence 
and famine were experienced as all a part of the same inevita­
ble order of things within which good and bad fortune alter­
nated.
Perhaps Tibet, with its Buddhist-based socio-religious order, was the 
only exception to this general rule.
There were other cultural factors involved. There was the Buddhist/ 
oriental conception of the cyclic nature of time and history. In the Bud­
dhist tradition this was given form in the doctrine of the samsaric na­
ture of life. Life had neither beginning nor ending; human destinies 
played a sort of obligato to the cyclic rhythms of world existence, inter­
weaving with them at a much faster pace. Hence in Buddhism the 
“ course of history” is much more like the spinning of a top, spinning 
in place, than like time’s speeding arrow, the image of time dominant 
in the modem West. Indeed some modern Buddhists (e.g., Masao Abe) 
maintain that time is reversible, history can be unmade so to speak, 
and that the Western notion of the linear progression of historically 
successive events, is somehow imposed on reality (Eastern-perceived 
reality) from outside its lived experiencing. (See Buddhist-Christian
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Studies, Honolulu, 1987, pp. 7-46.)
Be this as it may, the dominant Western Christian-humanist-scien­
tific sense of history is that of a non-cyclical, non-repetitive, dynamical­
ly on-rushing progression of events whose shape and outcome can in 
part be determined by human attitudes and actions. Precisely what the 
future holds for us we cannot be certain, only that it will be uniquely 
different from the past. No inevitably recurring cyclism here! It is quite 
obvious of course that Asian-nourished Buddhism will have to greatly 
adapt its traditional mode of conceiving history to make its influence 
felt in the socio-political hurly-burly of the West—perhaps even in the 
new East!
There is also the karmic tradition germane to Asian Buddhism. In its 
original Pali Canon form there are two features relevant here. The first 
is that one’s present state and character are solely his/her own respon­
sibility. Every one is the result of one’s own past deeds. This tends to 
produce a certain fatalism so far as one’s present life is concerned.
The second result flows from the first. Society is only the theatre in 
which somewhat pre-determined individual destinies are worked out. 
As Ken Jones puts it in his The Social Face o f Buddhism, “ Society is as­
sumed to be no more than the aggregate of the individuals composing 
it”  (p. 202). (He, a Britisher, brackets individual karma and opts for a 
societal form, that of present society inheriting and projecting its own 
traits.) Again the result here in Asian Buddhism has been a certain 
degree of social apathy; focus on individual destiny and its improve­
ment, and society will take care of itself.
Finally, as part of the Asian Buddhist heritage there is the view that 
the way to change the world is not by “ social action”  but changing the 
individual. It is not quite “ Let everyone become a Buddhist and then 
we will have a good world;” it is rather that one who is oneself subject 
to greed, hatred, or delusion cannot really change the world for the bet­
ter. All his/her actions will be tainted and the supposedly righteous 
deeds that are done for the good of the world will rather harm it. Jones 
quotes eleventh century Milarepa to this effect:
One should not be over-anxious and hasty in setting out to 
help serve others before one has oneself realized Truth in its 
fullness, (p. 202)
And when will one realize Truth in its fullness? Perhaps never—or
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hopefully in the next life. It would seem that if only the fully enlight­
ened Buddhist can deal with social problems, the day of full-scale Bud­
dhist social engagement will never come.
ENGAGED BUDDHISM OF THE PRESENT
But there are those who, though not claiming to be perfected saints, 
believe that appropriate Buddhist social engagement can and should be 
undertaken, here and now. Recently there has appeared an abundance 
of books dealing with the possibility and nature of Buddhist social ac­
tion. Here I shall deal with only two of these.
The first one to be noted is Inner Peace, World Peace: Essays on Bud­
dhism and Non-Violence, Kenneth Kraft, editor (SUNY Press, Albany, 
1992). It consists of eight essays, including an introductory one by 
Kraft. Though this book is keyed to a relatively narrow part of the 
total Buddhist spectrum, non-violence, non-violence is an important 
Buddhist value and violence of all sorts and degrees is a central world­
problem today. Further, other important matters inevitably come to 
our attention here.
Kraft’s introductory essay is well done. It calls attention to the diver­
sity of views within Buddhist circles about the authentic Buddhist role 
in the social-activist modern world. But it may be said to begin with 
that they all agree on one basic point. The book’s title itself gives us the 
key: Inner Peace, World Peace. That is, individual greed, hatred, and 
delusion are the basic human problems. As Kraft puts it: Social work 
entails inner work. “ A reform that is pursued only from a socio-politi­
cal standpoint they [Buddhists] assert will at best provide [only] tem­
porary solutions, and at the worst it will perpetuate the very ills it aims 
to cure” (p. 12). This can be taken as a basic Buddhist principle of all 
Buddhist social activism: the inner motivations of reformers and 
would-be reformers must always kept under close scrutiny.
The degree to which this is to be done, and perhaps more important­
ly in Buddhist eyes, the order in which self-scrutiny and activity are to 
be undertaken, is a matter of varied opinion. Though he has no essay 
in this volume, Thich Nhat Hahn is quoted as voicing in his many 
works something of a “ quietist”  view. “ If your steps are peaceful the 
world will have peace” (p. 20, emphasis added). Sometimes he says 
that being conscious of one’s breathing continually, or kissing and hug-
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ging friends and family, have their strong influence. Does this represent 
his basic view, or is it something of a reaction to the limited success, 
and some failures, of his earlier Vietnamese “ engaged Buddhism” ?
In the second essay Luis G6mez recognizes that there are cases in 
which “ avoiding violence may lead to the suffering of others. . . . 
where justice seems to require violence”  (p. 45). (Justice is a Western 
rather than a Buddhist word.) This requires a difficult decision for the 
Buddhist. But in every case what should distinguish Buddhist advo­
cates of non-violence is “ a recognition of an indispensable link be­
tween non-violence and self-cultivation”  (p. 46).
In the next essay Christopher Chappell presents a brief survey of 
Buddhist and Jain attitudes of disapproval of violence toward animals. 
Applying this principle to the present situation, Chappell sees two 
relevant applications: Buddhists may wish to adopt a vegetarian diet 
and there should be a study of and emphasis on a more careful “ hu­
mane” assessment of the use of animals in laboratories, perhaps limit­
ing it to genuine medical research on a high level.
Donald Swearer outlines the main features of the classic example 
of Buddhistic statecraft, that of ASoka. Then he describes a modern 
Thai exponent of this philosophy, the monk Buddhadassa, who has 
established a model community—harmonious, non-competitive—in 
up-country Thailand where he carries on his “ Buddha-dharma” com­
munity that emphasizes interdependence, restraint, and generosity. 
Buddhadassa propounds a “ dharmic socialism” for the world at large.
Robert Thurman takes Tibetan Buddhism, in its ideals and practice, 
as a truly Buddhist social order. He sees in the Dalai Lama’s philos­
ophy an outstanding exemplification of the true Buddhist attitude 
toward the world. He prays for the Chinese because “ violent oppres­
sors are also worthy of compassion” (p. 89). Thurman ends his essay 
with these words: “ From this [classic Buddhist] perspective the planet 
is perfectly arranged to facilitate our development” (pp. 89-90). Is this 
last sentence ironic, since the world today is full of violent oppres­
sors, toward whom there is ample opportunity to exercise compas­
sion? Seemingly not. The Tibetan model, expressed by the Dalai 
Lama’s quoted words, represents for Thurman the Buddhist mode of 
“ social action” par excellence.
Gene Sharp sees non-violent resistance (Ghandian and other types) 
as a valid, effective, and fully Buddhist social-action method. He
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believes that the non-violent method can achieve the desired effect in four 
ways: (1) Conversion of one’s opponents; (2) achieving accommoda­
tion of practices and policies by the opposition group; (3) the non­
violent coercion of one’s opponents into the desired course of action; 
(4) successful undermining of the opponent’s power-base.
Sulak Sivaraksa is perhaps the most activist of our group of authors, 
both by virtue of his Buddhist-based socio-political activities in his na­
tive Thailand (at considerable and growing personal risk), and because 
his suggestions here are the most ambitiously vigorous and political in 
nature. They are not confined narrowly to the non-violence theme, but 
cover a broad range of topics. He writes: “ The Buddhist approach to 
peace demands self-awareness and social awareness in equal measure” 
(p. 127). Meditation will loosen the hold of personal and social 
prejudices; but the Five Precepts—not to kill, not to steal, to abstain 
from illicit (non-marital) sexuality, to speak the truth, and not to use in­
toxicants, need to be interpreted in broad realistic terms. For example, 
not-killing should mean to remedy a world situation in which some live 
in rich abundance while others starve. Truth refers to false ideologies 
as well as personal truthfulness. Avoidance of intoxicants means also 
dealing with social and economic conditions that make drug-dealing 
profitable. He finds some sort of world government consonant with 
Buddhist principles.
The other essay, by Cynthia Eller, entitled “ The Impact of Christian­
ity on Buddhist Non-violence” is more analytic than prescriptive and is 
one of the most stimulating of the whole group. She sets forth some of 
the differences of basic viewpoint regarding social action between Bud­
dhist East and Christian West, with the implication that these will in 
time modify the traditional Asian Buddhist perspective in a Western 
Christian direction—or at least lead to some new emphases. For exam­
ple, she notes that the Westerner, following the Christian ethical 
model, “ identifies morality by the one necessary and sufficient criterion 
of other-regardingness” (p. 94) (emphasis added), whereas the Bud­
dhist pattern, as we have seen, is to first attend to (modify, purify) 
one’s own self by meditation and self-discipline before moving to im­
prove the conduct of others. In Eller’s words, “ Seeking enlightenment 
is a process of stripping away this illusion of separateness [from others] 
and correctly perceiving reality, in which self and other do not compete 
because they are not differentiated” (p. 95). Hence there is no “ social
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gospel”  as such in Buddhism. And Buddhists find it strange and jar­
ring that “ Christian ethics begins by promoting the other’s well-being 
in the conviction that this act of selflessness will, paradoxically, lead to 
the selfs  well-being”  (p. 97, emphases added).
Thus, as earlier suggested, even though this volume seems to have 
a narrow focus on non-violence, it makes an excellent introduction 
to the whole subject of the adaptation of Buddhism, as an essentially 
Asian-oriented culture and religion, to a Western (European-American) 
Christian/humanist context; from a basically traditional, conservative 
milieu to a dynamic, “ progress” -oriented, “ forward-looking” society, 
in which all of the road-signs are different. It suggests that by increas­
ing contact with and growth in the West, Buddhism will find itself 
changing and becoming more socially conscious and active.
The other volume to be considered here is Zen A wakening and Soci­
ety, by Christopher Ives (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1992). 
The first thing to be said about this volume is that Ives is scrupulous­
ly forthright and honest. Though committed to Zen personally, he 
neither attempts to whitewash Zen’s past record nor gild the lily of its 
truth till it is unrecognizable as what the outsider sees as “ Zen.” He 
seeks to set forth the basic Zen viewpoint/experience of awakening 
(satori) and develop from its character and implications a philosophy 
and program of Zen-inspired socially-conscious action. In attempting 
this he fully and frankly acknowledges the Zen tendency to cluster its 
concerns about the enlightenment experience as such, its historic isola­
tion in the monastery, and its societal inaction and easy accommoda­
tion to the politics and religion of the time. In conclusion he deals with 
a number of attempts to “ re-form” the Zen record and provide a social 
agendum adequate to the modem world, and to these adds some con­
crete suggestions of his own.
Why has Zen on the whole been socially inactive? Ives’ answer is 
this:
[D]oes Zen practice bear ethical fruits only upon Awakening? 
Or do such fruits emerge on “ this side” of Awakening as 
well? And if such fruits emerge in the process of Zen practice, 
how do they extend beyond personal transformation and 
facilitate social transformation as well? In general Zen 
authors have not addressed these questions primarily because
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of the focus on monastic attempts to lead people to Awaken­
ing and this emphasis on Awakening as the starting point of a 
truly ethical life. (34)
Resultingly, Zen in general has been on the whole very conformitarian 
to political and cultural forces during its Japanese historical career. 
For example, in the Tokugawa era, “ monks gave Buddhist precepts 
and Confucian values a popular expression. This guidance, however, 
did not call into question the social structures of the time. In short it 
[Zen] exhibited a conservative stance, despite images of Zen as 
iconoclastic”  (p. 66)- Zen could/did not translate its quest for and 
claim to enlightenment into ethical or societal values.
Is Zen then only geared to a highly individualistic spiritual attain­
ment which, when realized, results in a free, spontaneous personal life 
but does not concern itself with any social consequences, or formulate 
any principles of ethical action? As Ives puts it: Can Zen be productive 
of more than a “ tradition for the few, a type of spiritual elitism with a 
‘trickle down’ ethic?” (p. 35). Ives is convinced that the intrinsic Zen 
view and practice of life do have wider dimensions than this. He real­
izes the dangers of such statements as D. T. Suzuki’s that “ the satori 
experience . . . .  is essentially an affirmative attitude toward all things 
that exist; it accepts them as they come regardless of their moral 
values”  (p. 44). Ives comments that the Zen experience of “ seeing 
things in their suchness [as-they-areness] is neither a monistic ‘unity 
experience* in which all distinctions disappear nor an advanced case of 
ethical relativism” (p. 44).
Rather he sees Zen as an effort to escape the rigid absolutist distinc­
tions that cut the individual off from genuinely creative relationships 
with others and open one up to a fully dynamic awareness of the in­
tegral interrelatedness of all beings and situations to each other. This 
will not blot out awareness, a keen, perceptive awareness, of the differ­
ences of personal-social-historical identities and relationships, but will 
enable compassion to flow more freely in creative interaction with 
others who, no matter how “ different,”  are yet bound tightly together 
with us. It should enable individuals to “ uncover and criticize blind 
spots in individuals and institutions”  (p. 42) and not flatly claim that 
“ there is ‘nothing sacred’ with simultaneous piety toward Zen per­
sonages, lineages, and property” (p. 42). Zen ethics sees “ good and
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evil, and right and wrong as pragmatically important but not indicative 
of essences”  (p. 50). He does not say clearly, however, whether certain 
attitudes, say of hatred, are always wrong, as Buddhism usually main* 
tains. Or would that depend pragmatically on what was hated?
In Chapter 4 “ Recent Critiques and Developments”  Ives deals with 
the work of three individuals, the first two of whom have been his 
spiritual mentors. The late Shin’ichi Hisamatsu found the historically 
venerable monastic form of Zen too narrow and called for a layman’s 
Zen in which there would be the realization of the Formless Self 
(through a Zen-type awakening), by whose realization in groups of in­
dividuals, history can be created from a “ suprahistorical” dimension 
of living. Writes Ives: “ Although Hisamatsu provides a new form of 
practice for the laity, does he not end up offering another ethic for the 
awakened few [new style]?” (p. 83). Masao Abe calls for the realiza­
tion of Original Awakening (the fundamental condition of all human 
beings) which will awaken individuals to their “ suchness and inter­
dependence with other things”  and emancipate “ sentient beings from 
transmigration.”  Writes Ives of Abe’s work:
In his writings Abe grants more concreteness and specificity 
to the framework offered by his teacher Hisamatsu, [but] his 
largely philosophical approach does not provide treatment of 
ethical issues in concrete historical situations, (p. 94)
Ives likewise summarizes at some length the late Ichikawa Hakugen’s 
sharp criticism of Japanese Zen as meek and conformist, coming 
through as “ a detached subjective harmony with things rather than a 
dynamic theoretical framework from which to confront actuality.” 
But again Ichikawa offers only a general framework and some guiding 
principles (p. 94).
In Part II “ Toward a Zen Social Ethic”  Ives offers his own sugges­
tions which he hopes will more adequately, than heretofore, provide 
some important principles and concrete measures for the construction 
of a Zen social ethic. For him the core Zen position remains the same 
as always: A strong sense of the intimate, organic interrelatedness of 
all beings, the Mahayana sense of the “ emptiness” of sharply defined 
distinctions. This, as already noted, avoids sharp, hard, absolute princi­
ples and judgments; there is a strong flavor of practical pragmatism as 
to judgments and means to ends. The general sense of Zen freedom
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from absolutes should not be a peaceful meditational vacuum; the Bud­
dhist goal should be to save one to the world in compassionate service 
not from  it in isolated superiority. Ives suggests that individual social 
situations should be viewed as kOans. “ What does my, or our, present 
situation demand by way of wise/compassionate response and policy? 
What is the Buddhist way to deal with it?” might be forms this kOan 
would take.
The last pages are filled with concrete suggestions for appropriate 
Zen social attitudes and actions. Zen should cultivate the awareness of 
the organic interrelation of mankind and its environment, which legiti­
mates an ecological concern and working with other environmentalists. 
Ives finds the Western humanistic principle of the inalienable rights of 
the individual too narrow and “ fixatedly subjective”  but Zen can/ 
should call for full participation in one’s society and for such “ rights” 
as universal suffrage, education, etc. He advocates a sustainable eco­
nomics, an economy of “ enoughness” a la Shumacher’s Small is Beau­
tiful, The world economy should not be organized as it is at present, 
with 7%  of the population using 40% of its resources.
Buddhists should generally be opposed to violence; though Ives does 
not rigidly demand vegetarianism, he does suggest that Buddhists 
should work out a “ calculus of suffering”  to indicate which animal 
sources of human food suffer least upon death, to govern their dietary 
practices.
Perhaps it may be said that the importance and viability of the meas­
ures and attitudes proposed here as Zen-agreeable are less important 
than the fact of their designation, something new in traditional Zen cir­
cles. Hopefully Ives is here beginning a growing movement in Zen.
SOCIALLY ENGAGED BUDDHISM IN THE FUTURE
What can one say of the future of socially engaged Buddhism? Two 
things seem safe to say in general. First there will indeed be a continua­
tion of socially engaged Buddhism. Given the continuing penetration 
of the West (Europe and America) by Buddhism, it will continuingly be 
faced with the necessity of speaking out on social issues, which are in­
grained in the very nature of the dynamic, time-conscious West of 
which Buddhism seeks to become an integral part. Indeed some Bud­
dhists in the West may elect to follow what Ken Jones terms the
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“ quietist”  pattern of meditation and self-awakening/perfection only. 
But others will feel the need and obligation to become more actively in­
volved in their environing social life.
The second thing that seems relatively certain is that in the process of 
working with/in its Western environment (and perhaps also in the 
Western-influenced East) the Buddhist presentation will itself develop 
new facets. But the form of these facets remains the secret of the fu­
ture.
We may note in conclusion some interesting features of Buddhism- 
come-West. Both Theravftdin and Tibetan Buddhist groups have solid­
ly established themselves in communities and meditation centers in the 
West. But their basic approach seems to be a minimalist one: Their 
main, almost exclusive, agendum is that of personal transformation, 
the overcoming of greed, hatred, and delusion in the individual. That 
this will have some effect upon the social world about them is seemingly 
taken for granted. Whether this emphasis will continue unchanged 
remains uncertain.
Some other groups, mainly Japanese-oriented, such as the Nichiren 
ShdshO and the Jddo ShinshO, have established sizeable, missionary- 
minded groups in the United States, though their social-action pattern 
remains minimal. It seems that at present most of their energy goes into 
""legitimizing” themselves in the Western world, though they too are 
beginning “ social work.”
Rather surprisingly, considering the ingrown individualism and sub­
jectivity of the classical pattern of Zen enlightenment, it is from Zen 
individuals in the West that much of Buddhist “ engagement” has been 
initiated. One thinks of Robert Aitken, Ken Jones, Gary Snyder, ROshi 
Glassman (of Greystone Family Inn), for instance. What are the under­
lying factors here? It is perhaps that Zen has less doctrinal fixity and 
the possibility of more freedom of action, and hence can more readily 
adapt to new conditions once it escapes its Japanese institutional shell.
A second factor is that most of these Zen activists are Western-bom, 
nurtured in the Western-world atmosphere of Christian-humanist 
oriented culture in which socio-political expression and action are sec­
ond nature. It seems safe to predict that this will increasingly be the 
case in Western Buddhism and may be increasingly reflected in Asian 
Buddhism as well.
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